“They are now community police”: Negotiating the boundaries and nature of the Government in South Sudan through the identity of militarised cattle-keepers by Pendle, Naomi
  
Naomi Pendle 
“They are now community police”: 
Negotiating the 
boundaries and nature of the Government in 
South Sudan through the identity of 
militarized cattle-keepers 
Article (Refereed) 
Published version 
 
Original citation: 
Pendle, Naomi (2015) “They are now community police”: Negotiating the boundaries and nature 
of the Government in South Sudan through the identity of militarized cattle-keepers. International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights  22, (3) pp.410-434 ISSN 1385-4879 
 
 
DOI: 10.1163/15718115-02203006  
 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2015 The Authors CC BY-NC 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84468/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
international journal on minority and  
group rights 22 (2015) 410-434
brill.com/ijgr
© NAOMI PENDLE, 2015 | doi 10.1163/15718115-02203006
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 (CC-BY-NC 4.0) License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
“They Are Now Community Police”: Negotiating the 
Boundaries and Nature of the Government in South 
Sudan through the Identity of Militarised 
Cattle-keepers
Naomi Pendle
PhD Candidate, London School of Economics, London, UK
n.pendle@lse.ac.uk
Abstract
Armed, cattle-herding men in Africa are often assumed to be at a relational and spatial 
distance from the ‘legitimate’ armed forces of the government. The vision constructed 
of the South Sudanese government in 2005 by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
removed legitimacy from non-government armed groups including localised, armed, 
defence forces that protected communities and cattle. Yet, militarised cattle-herding 
men of South Sudan have had various relationships with the governing Sudan Peoples’ 
Liberation Movement/Army over the last thirty years, blurring the government – non 
government boundary. With tens of thousands killed since December 2013 in South 
Sudan, questions are being asked about options for justice especially for governing 
elites. A contextual understanding of the armed forces and their relationship to gov-
ernment over time is needed to understand the genesis and apparent legitimacy of 
this violence.
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1 Introduction1
On 15 December 2013, violence erupted in Juba, South Sudan among Nuer sol-
diers of the Presidential Guard. A force known colloquially as the Dut ku Beny 
participated in the armed reaction by the government the following day. This 
reaction in Juba was not limited to restraining rebelling Nuer soldiers, but 
included larger battles in other Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (spla) bar-
racks and the targeting of Nuer civilians in their homes. The Dut ku Beny are a 
force stationed near Juba and comprised of militarised, former cattle-keeping 
Dinka men who had been recruited from the home community of the President 
to the west of the Nile in Greater Bahr el Ghazal. Previously, the spla High 
Command had refused to either incorporate the Dut ku Beny into the spla or 
fund this force,2 justifying this based on the Dut ku Beny’s apparent ethnic 
homogeneity, and their focus on protection of the President and not the state.3 
The December 2013 violence changed the Dut ku Beny’s relationship to the 
spla, allowing them to be incorporated into the military operations and appa-
ratus of government.4 The leaked draft report of the African Union Commission 
of Inquiry in March 2015 drew attention to the possible culpability for violence 
of this ‘body of irregulars’ from Bahr el Ghazal.5
Since 2006, the spla has been a complex hybrid of incorporated clusters of 
armed men. The wars of the 1980s and 1990s in South Sudan (re)created a 
diverse swarm of armed groups who defended communities against the milita-
rised, arbitrary violence of the spla or the Government of Sudan (gos). After 
the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the spla and gos, 
these forces remained armed and prolific. In addition to the Khartoum-backed, 
wide reaching umbrella group of the South Sudan Defence Force (ssdf), there 
were also a prevalence of forces that had a more geographically local focus, 
such as the White Armies (associated with the Nuer), and the titweng and gel-
weng (associated with the Dinka, and on which this article focuses). Previous 
1 The author is grateful to Anna Macdonald, Rachel Ibreck and Alex De Waal for comments on 
this article.
2 M. D’Agot (former Deputy Minister of Defence) Draft African Union Commission of Inquiry 
Report, March 2015, p. 13.
3 Interview with Civil Servant in the Ministry of Defense, December 2013.
4 To an extent this appears to parallel the incorporation of the White Armies into the formal 
opposition force (the spla-In Opposition (spla-io)) in 2014. However, the White Armies 
have better maintained their own hierarchical structure.
5 Repeatedly mentioned in the early stages of the report. See e.g., Majak, supra note 2.
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commentaries have focused on forces that historically opposed the spla.6 
Instead, this article offers a contrasting example by considering groups that 
historically supported the spla.
After the cpa was signed, the continued existence and popularity of other 
armed groups challenged the military superiority and legitimacy of the spla, 
contradicting the cpa’s assumption that the spla, as the government army, 
would exercise a monopoly over the use of legitimate force7 and reassert the 
division between civilian and combatant.8 The cpa explicitly declared an end 
to armed groups in Southern Sudan other than the spla and gos, with armed 
forces limited to the army, police, prisons and wildlife forces.9 Other armed 
groups were to either be incorporated into these organised forces or be reinte-
grated as civil institutions.10
In 2005, Salva Kiir (as the new leader of the spla after the death of John 
Garang) initiated discussions with the largest, other armed group – the ssdf. 
In the new, post-Garang political landscape,11 discussions culminated in 
the  2006 Juba Declaration that incorporated the ssdf into the spla.12 This 
undermined the power of Garangists13 to control the spla and appeared to 
reduce the threat of a Southern civil war that risked undermining the self-
determination referendum promised for 2011.
The incorporation of the ssdf still left unanswered what would happen to 
other, non-government armed actors. Academic discourse usually makes a dis-
tinction between the state and non-state provision of security.14 In Dinka, the 
closest distinction is between the ‘government’ (hakuma) and the ‘home’ 
6 See e.g., J. Young, ‘The White Army: An Introduction and Overview’, Small Arms Survey 
(2007); M.B. Arnold and C. Alden, ‘This Gun is Our Food’: Disarming the White Army 
Militias of South Sudan, 7:3 Conflict, Security and Development (2007) pp. 361–375.
7 Weber’s classic definition of the state includes the state having a monopoly of the use of force.
8 United Nations Joint Inspection Unit inquiries were also legitimate.
9 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) p. 100. The status of the National Intelligence 
and Security Service was undetermined.
10 Ibid.
11 Integration of the ssdf into the spla brought this large armed group formally under 
Salva’s leadership and cemented his relationship with ssdf leader Paulino Matip.
12 Garang had opposed ssdf integration fearing it would “dilute” his leadership. See L.A. 
Warner, ‘Armed-Group Amnesty and Military Integration in South Sudan’, 158:6 Royal 
United Service Institute (2013) pp. 40–47.
13 Garangists were leaders in the spla perceived as dependent on the patronage of John 
Garang (the leader of the spla from its inception in 1983 to his death in 2005). They were 
nicknamed ‘orphans of Garang’ after his death.
14 B. Baker, ‘Linking State and Non-State Security and Justice’, 28:5 Development Policy Review 
(2010) pp. 597–616; A. Ebo, ‘Non-State Actors, Peacebuilding and Security Governance in 
West Africa: Beyond Commercialisation’, 3:2 Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 
 413“they Are Now Community Police”
international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 410-434
(baai).15 The ‘government’ refers to the government itself, its army and police 
force, as well as militarised rebel movements with a national political agenda. 
It is spatially associated with urban centres and distance from the ‘home’. In 
contrast, the ‘home’ is governed by the decision making of the family heads 
and the local leaders. Home communities often have their own, local defence 
force of armed youth and in pastoralist communities these defence forces are 
often synonymous with those who keep the cattle.
After the cpa, international observers and policy makers portrayed violence 
by the armed cattle-keeping men of the home as inherently illegitimate 
because they were non-government armed actors. They were portrayed as 
destructive and anarchistic in their violence, increasing the fragility of the new 
state of South Sudan.16 This built on broader assumptions that pastoralists are 
politically marginalised and distant from modern government,17 and moder-
nity due to their mobility and lifestyle.18 It ignored recent relationships with 
the spla and government forces. While many government leaders in South 
Sudan were from pastoralist communities and displayed an ongoing stake in 
cattle by privately investing in herds, official government policy more closely 
complied with the skeptical international sentiments. Post-cpa disarmament 
campaigns were targeted against the cattle-keeping home defences, including 
the Nuer White Armies, the Dinka titweng and the gelweng.
In December 2013, the spla “fell apart”19 across South Sudan, dividing along 
Nuer and Dinka lines or possibly, more accurately, along former spla-ssdf 
lines.20 This started the current civil war. Yet, these new levels of violence and 
fragmentation were also an opportunity to further reconstruct the government 
and its military apparatus. The Dut ku Beny, that had its historical origins in the 
(2007) pp. 53–69; K. Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces 
and Hybrid Governance in Africa’, 43:5 Development and Change (2012) pp. 1073–1101.
15 C. Leonardi, “Liberation’ or Capture: Youth In Between ‘Hakuma’, and ‘Home’ During Civil 
War and its Aftermath in South Sudan’, 106:424 African Affairs (2007) pp. 391–412.
16 E.g., J. Hatcher, The Gaurdian, South Sudan Unrest Exacerbated by Conflict Among Cattle 
Herders 11 March 2014, <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/11/south 
-sudan-conflict-over-cows> visited on 15 January 2015; usaid South Sudanese staff, work-
shop in Juba, July 2012 (in English).
17 J. Abbink, ‘The Shrinking Culture and Political Space of East African Pastoral Societies’, 38 
Nordic Journal of African Studies (1997) pp. 1–17; Interview with ngo worker, Juba, July 
2012 (in English); Discussion with dfid staff, Juba, July 2012 (in English).
18 V. Azarya, ‘Pastoralism and the State in Africa: Marginality or Incorporation?’, 38:11 
Nomadic Peoples (1996).
19 A. de Waal, ‘When Kleptocarcy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of The Civil War in 
South Sudan’, 113:452 African Affairs (2014) pp. 347–369.
20 All the senior commanders in the spla-io except James Koang are former ssdf commanders.
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institution of the titweng, was brought into the national military apparatus of 
the government. While the Dinka titweng, like the Nuer White Armies, were 
portrayed as being at a distance from the Government of South Sudan (goss) 
and were the focus of disarmament, this relationship gradually changed. In 
bringing the Dut ku Beny into the national army, a militarised group often 
assumed to be at a distance to the government was drawn across the concen-
tric lines of the state/non-state boundary – an act which itself redefined the 
nature of government.
In South Sudan, literature on other armed groups has focused on groups 
who opposed the spla and, therefore, appeared to be a greater explicit threat 
to the new goss.21 This article instead considers armed groups who fought 
with the spla before the cpa. The spla negotiated a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship with the militarised male age-group of the western Dinka in Bahr el 
Ghazal. Over time, they have been known by various names including ‘titweng’, 
‘gelweng’, ‘community police’ and some as the ‘Mathiang Anyoor’ (brown cater-
pillar) or ‘Dut ku Beny’.22 This provides a counter example to the assumption 
that such other armed groups are necessarily in opposition to the government. 
The ‘titweng’ was the first name given to a group of militarised men from the 
Western Dinka by the spla in the 1980s. Therefore, this term will be primarily 
used in this article to refer to these youths in general.
This article reflects on the negotiation of the titweng identity across the gov-
ernment – non-government boundary to better understand the ongoing con-
struction of the South Sudanese government. The elusive, “twilight”23 boundary 
between the state and non-state offers “a clue to the nature of the phenomenon” 
of the state itself,24 with “hybrid domains of security”25 a common focus of stud-
ies of this boundary. Apparently weak states still display order and security26  
21 See e.g., Young, supra note 6; Arnold and Alden, supra note 6.
22 Occasionally commentaries assume Mathiang Anyoor and Dut ku Beny are synonymous. 
Yet, the Dut ku Beny is commonly used in Juba to refer to a smaller force connected to the 
President. Alternatively, the Mathiang Anyoor refers to a larger group recruited from Bahr 
el Ghazal since 2012 that fought in Heglig and across South Sudan in 2014.
23 C. Lund, Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa (Development & 
Change Special Issues) (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2006).
24 T. Mitchell, ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics’, 85 The 
American Political Science Review (1991) pp. 77–96.
25 V. Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 21 Peace Review: A Journal of 
Social Justice (2009) p. 18.
26 N. Bagayoko, ‘Introduction: Hybrid Security Governance in Africa’, 43:4 ids Bulletin (2012) 
pp. 1–13; Baker, supra note 14; Boege et al., supra note 25; Meagher, supra note 14; 
K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers, ‘Kivu’s Intractable Security Conundrum’, 108:432 
African Affairs (2009) pp. 475–484; D. Anderson, ‘Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of 
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as citizens turn to alternative security providers27 and the state tries to designate 
non-state security mechanisms to improve their control.28 Yet, “it is in the strug-
gles and debates of local politics and property regimes that states are made, not 
simply in the projection of power outwards and downwards by the central 
state”.29 The titweng have not simply been co-opted by a powerful, militarised 
centre. In the negotiation of their identity across these boundaries, they have 
shaped the nature of government itself. For example, they have helped draw to 
the centre an ethnicised, Nuer-Dinka identity politics that was constructed 
amongst the titweng in the 1990s.
The recent crisis in South Sudan has initiated a belated transitional justice 
discourse. Previously, justice was rarely discussed. The cpa had ignored ques-
tions of accountability despite a strong demand from Southern Sudanese civil 
society.30 Despite the renewed demand for accountability, the complexity 
of  the titweng’s role in recent violence and their relationship to government 
illustrate the non-linear landscape of command that will make justice and 
accountability difficult, especially without a detailed contextual and historical 
understanding.
This article is based on three years of participant observation while living in 
the western Dinka from 2010–2012. The author continued to research in South 
Sudan until 2015.
2 A History of the Titweng
2.1 Constructing the Titweng
After the spla’s formation in 1983, the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region quickly 
offered support to this movement. By the late 1980s, the spla had established 
itself as the de facto government of almost all of Greater Bahr el Ghazal.31 
Public Order in Kenya’, 101:405 African Affairs (2002) pp. 531–555; B. Baker, ‘When the 
Bakassi Boys Came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism’, 20:2 Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies (2002) pp. 223–44; D. J. Smith, ‘The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence and 
the Political Imagination in Nigeria’, 19:3 Cultural Anthropology (2004) pp. 429–455.
27 B. Baker, Multi-Choice Policing in Africa (Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, 2007); H.M. Kyed, 
‘Community Policing in Post-war Mozambique’, 19:4 Policing and Society (2009) pp. 354–371.
28 Kyed, supra note 27, p. 90.
29 C. Leonardi, Dealing With Government in South Sudan, (James Currey, Woodbridge, 2013) 
p. 9.
30 See e.g., Y. Ajawin, ‘Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice’, in A.H. Abdel Salam 
and A. de Waal (eds.), The Phoenix State: Civil Society and the Future of Sudan (Red Sea 
Press, Trenton, 2001).
31 Some urban centres and road arteries remained under gos control.
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Communities (voluntarily and involuntarily) supported the spla war effort 
with food (including meat from livestock) and recruits. To undermine the 
spla, northern groups (that became known as the Murahaleen) were armed 
by the gos as a proxy force to conduct raids into these spla sympathising 
areas.32 Food shortages in the early 1980s had already encouraged raids into 
northern Bahr el Ghazal from southern Darfur and Kordofan, yet these raids 
increased in scale from 1985 with the start of gos support.33 These armed raids 
killed hundreds, and took captive property and people. The western Dinka not 
only shared a border with the north, but also, to the east, a border with remain-
ing Anyanya ii fighters (based in Western Upper Nile) who resisted the spla 
leadership of the southern rebellion, and from the mid 1990s, led the ssdf. 
Supported by gos from 1984, they were another proxy force used to fight the 
spla. For example, in the 1988 and 1989 dry season, a combined Anyanya ii 
and Murahaleen force attacked the far northeast of Bahr el Ghazal.34 To the 
western Dinka, therefore, the spla war brought unprecedented levels of 
uncertainty and violence.
Socio-political structures of the Dinka home community had long provided 
security.35 After childhood and before marriage, men were expected to have 
recourse to violence to protect their community and their cattle. With the rise 
in violence from northern raids in the late 1980s, the titweng (“protectors of the 
cattle”) were formed utilising the militarised nature of this age-group and 
incorporating support from the quasi government of the spla. While the tit-
weng were a response to the demands of the home community, local memory 
and the media36 recall them as also an innovative idea of the spla.37 This new 
force of the titweng provided a defence for Bahr el Ghazal against gos’s proxy 
forces and compensated for a lack of adequate spla protection.38 They were 
32 D. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
2003) p. 69.
33 A.N. Mawson, ‘Murahaleen Raids on the Dinka’, 15:2 Disasters (1991) pp. 137–149.
34 Mawson, supra note 33, p. 144.
35 A.N. Mawson, The Triumph of Life: Political Dispute and Religious Ceremonial Among the 
Agar Dinka of Southern Sudan, 1989.
36 See for example, Mayom, M, “Youths, gelweng leaders called on to help voter drive in 
Lakes”, Sudan Tribune, 13 November 2009, <www.sudantribune.com/Youths-gelweng 
-leaders-called-on,33132> visited on 31 May 2013.
37 A. O’Brien, ‘Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign’, 16 
Small Arms Survey (2009) p. 24; Sudan Tribune, Lakes State Gets New Military Caretaker 
Governor, 22 January 2013, <www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45271>, visited on 
4 April 2013.
38 Johnson, supra note 32; Executive Chief, Kuajok (Warrap State), April 2012 (in Dinka).
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armed and reorganised by the more formal spla. In the late 1980s,39 Kiir pro-
vided spla officers to help train and command the titweng,40 with training 
usually limited to operation of D-47s.41 If not provided by the spla, families 
personally invested capital in guns for their sons with tacit permission from 
the spla. In the early days of the late 1980s, they were also known as ‘Tit Baai’ 
(protectors of the home) or the ‘Machar Anyar’ (black buffalo).42 There was 
little resistance to recruitment into the titweng, as it facilitated protection of 
their own communal property and offered them the opportunity to restore 
their dignity43 after the severity of raids. They offered a “civil defense capabil-
ity” that resulted in a major decrease in abductions, forcible displacement and 
cattle raids.44
Prior to the institution of the titweng, age-sets had structured these milita-
rised groups of young men. Age-sets are remembered as a leaderless group of 
male youth initiated into manhood during the same, multi-year season. Age-
sets were often exclusive groupings with a discrete membership45 and com-
mon across the “tribe” in that they collectively “call the sets by the same 
names”.46 In many pastoral societies, political life is regulated by these age-
based organisations,47 with a younger ‘warrior grade’ age-set below the age-set 
with normative authority.48 Younger age-sets would compete with the older, 
dominant age-sets to establish their supremacy and normative authority. This 
allowed notions of equality at the same time as a hierarchical structure to 
 facilitate both moral leadership and military protection. Amongst the western 
39 Events are dated based on interviews in the western Dinka, although exact dates could 
often not be recalled. Kiir’s initial support of the titweng is remembered as during the era 
of increased Murahaleen raiding, before the spla division between Garang and Riek, that 
other research highlights as having occurred at the end of the 1980s.
40 B. Malwal, Sudan and South Sudan: From One to Two, Palgrave Macmillan (2014) p. 178; 
A. Adal, as recorded by A.M. Anai, ‘Warrap State Peace and Reconciliation Conference - 
Mayen Rual’, pact Report, 17 June 2005.
41 J.M. Jok and S. Hutchinson, ‘Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of 
Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities’, 42:2 African Studies Review (1999) p. 134.
42 Executive Chief, Kuajok (Warrap State), February 2013 (in Dinka).
43 Jok and Hutchinson, supra note 41.
44 Hope Project, Best Practices and Tools for Community Based Peace-Building in South 
Sudan, 2002, <www.chf.ca/documents/Studies_And_Reports/HOPE_Book5.pdf>, visited 
on May 2013; Malwal, supra note 40.
45 M. Doss, Evans-Pritchard and Segmentary Structures Amongst the Nuer: a Reappraisal 
(2000).
46 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1940) p. 289.
47 Abbink, supra note 17.
48 Ibid., p. 5.
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Dinka, competition between age-sets had become more theatrical and sym-
bolic than a full display of the young men’s force. Age-sets and contestation 
remain common elsewhere in South Sudan,49 although they vary in their exact 
form and the role they play in constructing a physically protected moral 
community.
The formation of the titweng brought a radical, spla-enforced departure 
from the age-set system amongst many western Dinka. spla actively recon-
structed the militarised youth by pausing the age-sets system and inter-age 
competitions. Instead, they encouraged a unified larger group to fight together 
irrespective of their years of initiation, with the assumption that a larger group 
would better defend against large raiding groups from the north. This further 
made fictitious notions of shared lineage and familial ties that had been used 
to construct social unity amongst warring militarised youth. While literature 
has suggested increased violence from youth based on generational tensions,50 
this reformation of the titweng structurally reduced inter-generational con-
tests between proximate age-sets, suggesting a more complex understanding 
of youth.51
Previously, age-sets were not ‘imagined communities’ to the extent that 
their members all knew each other individually.52 These newly formed larger 
groupings of the titweng were now too vast for members to all know each other 
personally, requiring the imagination and construction of this group. 
Symptomatic of these larger, imagined groupings was the introduction of 
informal uniforms to mark the group’s boundary. Without uniforms they could 
not quickly distinguish between enemies and fellow fighters during combat. 
The lack of clothes available during wartime obliged fighters to tie palm tree 
leaves around their wrists in unique fashions to tell themselves apart.53
49 For example, amongst the Murle and Nuer. See, for example, <www.radiomiraya.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5394:ushering-in-a-ruling-age-set 
-among-the-pari&catid=91:91&Itemid=339>. See Lewis (1972) for a description of the 
Murle age-set system.
50 See e.g., J.M. Jok, ‘War, Changing Ethics and the Position of Youth in South Sudan’, in 
J. Abbink and I. van Kessel (eds.), Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa 
(Brill, Leiden, 2005) p. 145.
51 Leonardi challenges the assumption that violence is necessarily a result of generational 
tension. Leonadri, supra note 15.
52 This references Anderson’s use of ‘imagined communities’ in: B. Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (2006) p. 6.
53 Aguok Dinka titweng, Kuajok (Warrap State), April 2012 (in Dinka); Agaar Dinka chief, 
Malek (Lakes State), June 2012 (in Dinka).
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The groups were also less bounded and static in their membership; all fight-
ing men in the home communities could be considered as titweng. The more 
prominent cleavage was no longer between age groups, but between those 
fighting for their home communities and those captured by the government 
sphere. With growing education, urbanisation and association with the gov-
ernment, including through joining the spla, increasing numbers of youth 
were not entering these local defence forces. Scarification as part of the home 
initiation into manhood was one symbol of this boundary of the titweng as it 
was primarily the youth who remained in the cattle-camps and home commu-
nity who were scarified. Yet, this was still not clear-cut as many of those who 
were scarified went on to be educated, join the spla or enter the government 
sphere by other means.
Yet, with the titweng supported by the spla, could the titweng themselves 
be considered part of the government sphere? Leonardi describes how “the 
spla used a combination of violence and patronage to transfer the allegiance 
of young soldiers from their families to the military hierarchy”.54 Yet, unlike the 
young soldiers described who had been recruited into the spla and trained 
far  from their homelands, the titweng remained in their home communities 
and therefore did not experience the same shift to subjection to the military 
hierarchy.
Nevertheless, there was ambiguity over whether the titweng had been cap-
tured by government. Gun ownership was associated with the government 
sphere. Prior to the spla war, guns were largely limited to government control 
and ownership. In the latter half of the 1900s, the British government, due to 
their superior military might, had quashed much of the trickle of arms traded 
into Sudan from the east and north, often in exchange for ivory. The dominant 
owners of guns were government officials (using guns to shoot wildlife as well 
as enhance security) and government chiefs. The association of guns with the 
government continued into the post-cpa era. People interviewed often referred 
to guns as belonging to the government in general terms, even if specific guns 
they described were privately owned. Therefore, in acquiring guns, the titweng 
gained symbolic proximity to the government and, in this case, the spla. 
Distribution of guns blurred the home – government line and left the titweng 
sitting ambiguously between the two.
The titweng also explicitly supported the spla. On occasion, they would 
supplement spla’s deployments,55 especially when the spla were fighting 
54 Leonadri, supra note 15, p. 399.
55 Hope Project, supra note 44.
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near their homelands. One account describes them as a proxy force for the 
spla, participating in 197 military operations in Bahr el Ghazal.56
The utility of the titweng prompted competition between vying spla elites. 
There was ongoing competition between Kiir and Garang for ultimate author-
ity over the spla in Bahr el Ghazal,57 and there was dissatisfaction from the 
home community of Bahr el Ghazal over Garang’s failure to prioritise their 
protection from northern raids.58 Garang was skeptical of the titweng because 
they were a coordinated, armed group that was not directly controlled by the 
spla,59 or at least not controlled by him. Rumours started that the titweng 
were loyal to Kiir and a counter-force to Garang.60 However, the benefits of the 
titweng for the broader spla effort were hard to deny as they freed up spla 
soldiers to focus on their fight with Khartoum.61 Plus, the protected herds were 
also a source for the feeding of the spla. The cows were even known as the 
‘bank of Garang’.
The spla influence over these armed Dinka youths appeared to make it 
more difficult for chiefs to control them.62 Yet, contemporary chiefs often 
contrast spla soldiers with the titweng, highlighting the legitimacy and con-
tinued obedience of the latter. The titweng’s lack of consumption of alcohol, 
compliance to the customary courts, and respect for gun control by local 
authorities are all given as examples of their continuing subscription to the 
normative values of the home. Unlike spla soldiers, they do not fall under 
the direct command, or have the ability to levy the authority of, a distant 
spla commander. They are also reliant on resources of the home, such as 
cattle, for life and marriage. For example, one day in 2012, while singing to his 
song bull, a titweng amongst the Apuk Dinka fired a shot into the air in cele-
bratory happiness. At the time, local authorities had banned the firing of 
guns in celebration in case it was misunderstood as an act of aggression. The 
titweng was fined a bull by the local chief and did not resist compliance with 
this demand.
Yet, it should be noted that chiefs, themselves had a complex relation-
ship  with the spla, not sitting in the sphere of the home, but across the 
56 P.A. Nyaba, ‘The Disarmament of the Gel-Weng of Bahr el Ghazal And The Consolidation 
of the Nuer – Dinka Peace Agreement 1999’, (Sudan Council of Churches and Pax Christi, 
2001) p. 5.
57 Malwal, supra note 40.
58 Johnson, supra note 32, p. 109.
59 Johnson, supra note 32.
60 Malwal, supra note 40, p. 179.
61 O’Brien, supra note 37.
62 Jok and Hutchinson, supra note 41.
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 home-government boundary. While many chiefs had an authority indepen-
dent of the spla, many also supplemented and maintained their authority 
through a negotiated relationship with the spla that made them part of the 
spla/M governance structure.
2.2  A New Ethnic Idiom
The 1990s brought a new era of South-South violence that incorporated into 
the titweng a stronger ethnicised vision of being Dinka63 and created the new 
iteration of the gelweng.
In 1991, Riek Machar split from John Garang’s spla. Riek sought support 
from the Nuer and encouraged an ethnic, militarised narrative to the divi-
sion.64 This failed to unite the Nuer,65 but did militarise the Dinka and Nuer 
division.66 By the mid-1990s, Riek armed the western Nuer youth, who became 
known as White Soldiers.67,68 They would defend against and raid into western 
Dinka areas controlled by Garang’s spla. The Dinka were portrayed as synony-
mous with Garang’s spla, making them legitimate targets based on ethnic 
identity.
With the violent raids into Dinkalands now occurring further south, the ini-
tiated cattle guard of what is now Lakes State were instituted as gelweng by 
spla authorities, mimicking the institution of the titweng.69 As one chief and 
former gelweng explained, “We were given guns to protect our cows. That’s 
when we started to be called gelweng”.70 During this time, gun ownership 
became considered as a necessary condition for being a gelweng. The gelweng 
would often also be given ten milking cows that would allow them to move 
ahead of the main cattle camps with a supply of milk.71 These gelweng became 
the armed frontline to offer a strong defence to protect the home community, 
63 The spla-Anyanya 2 war of 1983–87 militarized the Dinka and Nuer division, but this was 
eased by 1980s Nuer leadership in the spla such as Riek Machar. At this time, the titweng’s 
‘enemy’ was ‘Nuer’ but raiders from the north.
64 Jok and Hutchinson, supra note 41.
65 Johnson, supra note 32.
66 Jok and Hutchinson, supra note 41.
67 ‘White soldiers’ contrast with trained, formal ‘black soldiers’.
68 Nuer White Armies to the west of the Nile were influenced by those to the east yet the 
western Nuer White Army had its own institutional idioms and did not become as infa-
mous for wide scale mobilizations over large geographic territories.
69 Gelweng, Gun Cattle Camp (Lakes State), June 2012 (in Dinka).
70 Executive Chief, Lakes State, June 2012 (in Dinka).
71 Anai, supra note 40.
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the cattle and the spla against Riek’s forces and the Nuer. They were seen as 
the Dinka equivalent of the Nuer White Army.72
‘Titweng’ and ‘gelweng’ both translate as ‘protectors’ or ‘guardians of the 
cattle’. ‘Titweng’ remains common amongst the northern Dinka while ‘gelweng’ 
is used further south and has become the more common generic reference for 
both groups. This article continues to use ‘titweng’ as the generic term due to its 
historic primacy.
3 The Titweng after the Peace Agreements
The 1999 local Wunlit peace agreement reduced conflict between the western 
Nuer and Dinka. Plus, the return of Riek to the spla in 2001, the 2005 cpa and 
the 2006 Juba Declaration brought a new discourse of peace to South Sudan. If 
there was a landscape of peace, then the continuation of local defence forces 
appeared meaningless and functionless.73 As discussed above, the vision of the 
cpa also excluded other, non-government armed groups. As the titweng, like 
the White Armies, were not to be integrated into the spla, they were to be 
disarmed to recreate a clear civilian – soldier divide, give a monopoly on the 
use of the gun back to the government74 and eliminate these other armed forc-
es.75 Even in local ontology, it made sense for the guns to be recollected by the 
government as “the guns don’t belong to the cattle-keepers; they belong to 
the government”.76 The guns had been a loan from the spla government to the 
cattle-keepers and their return was symbolic of a new era of peace and secu-
rity. Disarmament of the White Armies was a focus for the government as their 
history of violent opposition to the spla carried the danger of undermining 
the spla/M led government. Yet, disarmament was also carried out amongst 
the titweng and gelweng.77
The post cpa narrative ignored the titweng’s previous relationship to the 
spla and reimagined them as uncontrolled, armed cattle-keeping youth at a 
72 Executive Chief, Lakes State, June 2012 (in Dinka); Jok and Hutchinson, supra note 41; 
M. LeRiche and M. Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence, p. 101.
73 O’Brien, supra note 37.
74 Greater Aweil Dialogue (2003), Wanyjok 8 June, as mentioned in M. Bradbury et al., Local 
Peace Processes in Sudan (Rift Valley Institute, London, 2006).
75 Young, supra note 6, p. 20.
76 Executive Chief, Tonj East (Warrap State), June 2012 (in Dinka).
77 For an example of a report on this disarmament see Safer World, ‘Civilian Disarmament in 
South Sudan: A Legacy of Struggle’, February 2012; Safer World, People’s Peace Making 
Perspectives: South Sudan (Safer World, London 2012).
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distance from the government. Their violence was explained by “cattle-rearing 
culture”78 and “limited opportunities for youth in the cattle-based economy”79 
with cattle raiding perceived as a calculated livelihood option for the most 
poverty stricken.80 Youth-implemented violence was linked with generational 
rebellion,81 assuming that the elders saw the titweng as dangerous.82 A local 
chief described the titweng as turning their guns on themselves to settle more 
localised grievances.83 At local peace conferences, senior spla figures criti-
cised the titweng for having “grown horns and become equal to the 
government”.84 Another politician described how, “The gun in those days was 
to protect the cattle but now it is to kill us and our cattle”.85 They accused the 
titweng of following alternative authority figures, such as Mabiordit – a free 
spirit active in Bahr el Ghazal.86 The imagined distance from the government 
also prevented accusations of government culpability for titweng violence, pre-
serving the post cpa sentiment that insecurity was due to government weak-
ness not culpability.
Yet, the titweng remained legitimate locally and individual government 
leaders often supported the titweng of their own community. For many South 
Sudanese, the post cpa experience was of ongoing violence in the form of cat-
tle raiding, disarmament campaigns and explicit political rebellions. Amongst 
the western Nuer and Dinka, having enjoyed relative peace after the 1999 
Wunlit Agreement, the cpa reignited violence. In this context, the titweng 
maintained their legitimacy and form as a local defence force with significant 
public authority. Local government officials would appeal to the titweng for 
support to ensure security in their counties and chiefs would actively nurture 
relationships with these youth sometimes by providing ammunition. As before 
the cpa, the titweng continued to effectively support local government and 
the spla near their homelands as a proxy force. For example, after the 2010 
78 lwf (Lutheran World Federation) ‘lwf Supporting Peace Process Launched by Sudan 
Council of Churches’ <www.lutheranworld.org/lwf/index.php/youth-south-sudan-peace 
.html>, visited on 23 January 2012.
79 Enough, ‘Conflicts in South Sudan’ <www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/sudans/conflicts 
-south-sudan> visited on May 2013.
80 O’Brien, supra note 37; Safer World 2012; Sommers and Schwartz 2011.
81 Jok, supra note 50.
82 C. Vandewint and M.C. Atem, ‘Gogrial Counties Reconciliation and Peacebuilding 
Conference’, 11 May 2004.
83 Executive Chief, Warrap State, November 2011 (in English).
84 Anai, supra note 40.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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 election, there was violent dissent by various rebel groups in South Sudan.87 In 
May 2011, there was a large, armed raid into a western Dinka cattle camp by the 
rebel South Sudan Liberation Army.88 A small spla force offered no protection 
from this attack. Titweng ambushed the retreating rebel force, rescuing most of 
the stolen herds and killing many of the attackers. The titweng both protected 
their home and undermined government opposition.
The titweng’s defence also protected the personal cattle of some of the highest 
politico-military leaders in Juba that used these grazing lands. With oil revenue 
flowing to the Southern government since the cpa, being an elite in the South 
Sudanese government not only brought power, but also private wealth. For elites 
from Bahr el Ghazal, the titweng offered protection to their large personal invest-
ments in cattle. Elites built loyal, co-ethnic networks through patronage, includ-
ing through the giving and lending of cattle that constructed a binding relationship. 
As well as through cattle exchange, having a large herd in itself also bestowed 
status. As the nephew of a senior spla figure described, “My uncle in Juba89 has 
bought thousands of cattle that are now in our grazing lands. He is aspiring to 
own 10,000 cattle”.90 This uncle had opted to invest most of his monetary wealth 
in cattle in his home grazing lands. These cattle were not only a visible display of 
his wealth and power, but he also used the cattle as dowry for numerous wives. 
Despite the wealth to heavily invest in cattle, it was only eight years after the cpa 
that he first invested in building a ‘modern’, brick house in his homelands.
Investment in cattle by the elites transferred wealth from the government 
centre to the space of the grazing lands. This helps to explain the resumption 
of fighting in the grazing lands from 2005. Leading politicians would arm their 
nephews to guard their cattle. As one young man explained, “I am given guns 
by my uncle in Juba to guard his cattle. I am proud to guard his cattle. Yet, of 
course, if the cattle are raided or I lose any of his cattle to illness, I must get 
more cows. He cannot accept that his herd gets smaller. So I raid more cattle 
for him and he helps me with ammunition when he can”.91 Elites relied on fam-
ily networks and the established socio-political groups of the cattle camp to 
provide care of their cattle. In return, the carer-giver gained milk, a portion of 
the calves, weapons and the promise of access to large dowries for marriage.
87 De Waal discusses rebel groups in relation to the ‘political market place’. De Waal, supra 
note 19, p. 349.
88 According to a un source, vehicles were waiting to transport the raided cattle to Khartoum 
to fund the nascent ssla.
89 This ‘uncle in Juba’ is a senior figure in the spla who works closely with Salva Kiir.
90 University student, Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal), March 2012 (in English).
91 Titweng, Greater Bahr el Ghazal, June 2012 (in Dinka).
 425“they Are Now Community Police”
international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 410-434
While disarmament in Bahr el Ghazal was not as notoriously violent as 
amongst the White Armies,92 the ongoing violence in the home communities 
and the utility of the titweng prompted dislike of disarmament from both 
elites, but also people in the home communities. Chiefs questioned the gov-
ernment’s legitimacy to remove the ‘protector’ of the gun when it failed to pro-
vide alternative protection.93 Frustration was increased by a perception that 
the government owed the titweng for their wartime support. As one long- 
serving Dinka chief described in the context of a discussion about the titweng, 
disarmament and security, “[d]uring the time of war, we all contributed. So, 
now, we thought the government would help us. Through our contribution, the 
spla took Rumbek. Now they are enjoying the benefits, but we have nothing”.94
Often only the titweng who guarded the herds of the elites remained 
armed.95 As one recently disarmed gelweng described, “[w]e will not survive. 
We thought the government was our protector, but they have turned away 
from us. We will just remain and die. We can do nothing”.96 One sub chief 
explained the gun’s import: “[f]or us, our cows are also taken. Like, the person 
called Majok, his eighteen cows were taken. This thing occurs always . . . If we were 
having guns, our things could not have been taken like that”.97 One gelweng ques-
tioned whether the whole institution that provided local defence had now ended 
with the removal of guns:
There are no gelweng now as there are no guns. You cannot be a gelweng 
when you don’t have a gun. This is because without a gun you have no 
power; you are instead just a young man in the cattle camp. You have no 
power to protect anyone.98
Preference was also expressed for the titweng and gelweng over the spla as 
they understood local priorities. “The gelweng are stronger than soldiers 
because soldiers are not from our clan, they are not our children and their 
cows are not nearby; they need orders from above. Soldiers like first to put on 
boots”.99 One chief also described his confidence that the titweng were as 
92 Young, supra note 6.
93 Executive Chief, Tonj East (Warrap State), June 2012 (in Dinka).
94 Executive Chief, Lakes State, June 2012 (in Dinka).
95 O’Brien, supra note 37, p. 26.
96 Gelweng, Gun Cattle Camp (Lakes State), June 2012 (in Dinka).
97 Speech of Sub Chief, Akot Security Meeting (Lakes State, June 2012 (in Dinka).
98 Gelweng, Gun Cattle Camp (Lakes State), June 2012 (in Dinka).
99 Gelweng, Cattle Camp (Lakes State), May 2012 (in Dinka).
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strong as spla soldiers and just as capable in local defence and securing land 
claims.100
Local popular discourse and bull songs101 often honoured militarised acts of 
the youth and referenced the bravery of the titweng. Women discussed their 
pride in sons who were part of the titweng and described methods used from 
an early age, such as story telling, to foster in their sons a responsibility to par-
ticipate in community defence.102 In Lakes State in 2012, children interviewed 
in cattle camps and primary schools predominantly aspired to be gelweng.103 
Formally educated youth often were eager to highlight their distinction from 
the titweng (especially to the audience of this educated researcher),104 yet they 
still relied on the brothers who were titweng to look after their cattle and they 
would spend salaries buying ammunition for the titweng. There was ambiguity 
amongst mothers interviewed over their preference for sons to aspire to be 
educated or part of the titweng, with many preferring diversity amongst their 
children.105
3.1 An Alternative to Disarmament
The titweng were actively drawn into government as an alternative to their dis-
armament, again blurring the government – home boundary and altering the 
limits of their legitimate violence. The cpa had given two alternatives for other 
armed groups – return to being civilians (that was implemented via disarma-
ment) or integration into the forces of the government. The titweng could legit-
imately possess guns by being incorporated into the government.
From the 1999 Wunlit peace agreement, it was suggested that titweng could 
“come under the discipline of the military forces in each area”.106 As early as 
2003 in Aweil, it was posited that the “gelweng should be turned into police” 
and that these police should be controlled by the chiefs as members of the local 
government.107 In 2006 in Yirol, it was argued that the gelweng could be trans-
formed into a uniformed security force that would assist police in collecting 
100 Executive Chief, Greater Gogrial (Warrap State), March 2012 (in Dinka).
101 Cattle-keeping men often commission a song to reflect their family and personal history 
that they will learn and sing to their song bull.
102 Group discussion with 23 women, county head quarters in Warrap State, June 2012.
103 Half a dozen cattle camps were visited and two rural primary schools, September 2012.
104 Group of six educated youth, county head quarters in Warrap State, June 2012.
105 Group discussion with 23 women, county head quarters in Warrap State, June 2012.
106 Resolution 4 (D) of the Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference, 
Wunlit Sudan, 27 February 1999–8 March 1999.
107 Greater Aweil Dialogue, note 49.
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taxes, executing court verdicts and preventing illegal cattle trading.108 In adja-
cent Nuer areas, armed youth were often controlled by county com missioners. 
In the 2009 preparations for the national election, the gelweng of Lakes State 
were also utilised to mobilise voters in a quasi government function.109 From 
2012 in Warrap State, individuals in government used the internationally legiti-
mate concept of ‘community police’ to draw the titweng into government.
Renaming the titweng as ‘community police’ symbolically incorporated 
them into government and drew on international discourse about police sec-
tor reform in post-conflict settings,110 giving a semblance of international legit-
imacy to this new iteration of the titweng. While ‘community policing’ had 
become a popular state building policy in fragile states,111 it remained a vague 
and ambiguous term.112 Locally, ‘community police’ was described as an 
English translation of titweng.
The following field notes recount a first encounter with ‘community police’ 
in May 2012 while travelling to interview titweng Majok:
We stopped to ask after Majok. We were quickly directed towards a clus-
ter of trees. As we approached I realized we were being directed to a 
newly created military training ground marked by a single rope on the 
ground. The ordered rows of young men also suggested the discipline of 
the army.
Thirty of the local titweng received tuition from a uniformed army 
official. While I was familiar to the others and greetings were abundant, I 
was new to this army official. My sudden appearance prompted the need 
for an explanation. I explained that I was hoping to interview Majok – a 
titweng who composed bull songs. ‘They are now ‘Community Police’ and 
108 ‘Gelweng Militias to Have Role in Lakes State – Yirol Officials’, Sudan Tribune, 22 November 
2008.
109 Mayom, supra note 31.
110 E.g., community policing was included in dfid’s 16 million gbp Sudan Safety and Access 
to Justice Programme (2010–2014).
111 Examples of discussion include: L. Denny, and S. Jenkins, “Securing Communities: The 
What and the How of Community Policing: Background Paper”, odi, July 2013; M. Brogden 
and N. Preeti, Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches 
(Willan Publishing, Cullompton, 2005); H. M. Kyed, ‘State Vigilantes and Political 
Community on the Margins in Post-War Mozambique’ in D. Pratten and A. Sen (eds.), 
Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence. (Hurst Publishers, London, 2007).
112 M. Numzio, ‘Thugs, Spies and Vigilantes: Community Policing and Street Politics in Inner 
City Addis Ababa’, 84:3 Africa (2014) pp. 444–465.
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not titweng’, was part of the official’s reply. As we walked away, my trans-
lator explained that now all ‘titweng’ are ‘community police’.
In 2012, there were two phases of absorption of titweng into the community 
police. Initially only a select few titweng were given training at specific camps 
for a set period of time. As one titweng described during this initial phase:
Chiefs selected certain youths from the titweng to be trained. They will 
only be policemen in the toic [grazing lands]. The commissioner and 
other military people are training them. They will be given guns. But they 
will not be soldiers. They will be more like police.113
During this phase, they were given police-like uniforms that the youth perceived 
transformed them from being part of the home community to being part of the 
government.114 The uniforms were seen as a symbol of the government, providing 
a clear boundary between what they had become and the titweng they were before.
Receipt of salaries had become an additional benefit associated with cap-
ture by government, especially since the cpa and goss’s receipt of oil revenues. 
In the patchwork spla, salaries were a means of “paying the soldiers not to 
fight the government”.115 While the incorporation of the titweng drew on ideas 
of home loyalty and defence, salaries were also demanded by the new ‘com-
munity police’ as an incentive for being in government, and were paid by the 
government to encourage compliance. This shift to being paid and more clearly 
being under the authority of local government officials as opposed to the chiefs 
brought explicit fears that they would be less disciplined,116 as chiefs were able 
to more closely control the smaller number of titweng under their authority.
In the later phase of titweng absorption, it became assumed that all titweng 
should be considered as ‘community police’, allowing all the titweng to remain 
legitimately armed and increasing the defence force available. This larger 
group was not presented with the same symbols of the government, such as 
police uniforms or salaries. Without these symbols, community police were 
not such a discrete and bounded group. There was little to distinguish the com-
munity police from the youth of the home in general. It was unclear if there 
was even such a distinction. However, uniform-like outfits of homogenously 
coloured clothes had previously been given by individual local government 
113 Titweng, Greater Gogrial (Warrap State), February 2012 (in Dinka).
114 Community Police, Greater Gogrial (Warrap State), April 2012 (in Dinka).
115 Warner, supra note 11, p. 45.
116 Market place conversations, rural market in Warrap State, September 2012 (in Dinka).
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 figures to renegotiate their popularity amongst and informal control over the 
titweng.117 The colour of the clothing allocated depended on the socio-political 
section to which they were assumed to belong by these local government 
authorities. For example, titweng from Gogrial West County were given black 
clothes with red trimmings. In Gogrial East County, titweng wore different 
colours depending on their wut (cattle camp or section). The Amuk wut, for 
example, wore purple. The titweng accepted these clothes as rewards for their 
security provision and a sign of the post war prosperity. They were contrasted 
with the palm leaves that had to be worn during the war years. Yet, this gave 
local government control over the identity of titweng and over each grouping 
each titweng belonged to. In practice, these were not contested.
The following field notes from March 2012 further illustrate the local govern-
ment relationship to the titweng:
[t]itweng had gathered in the county capital on the instruction of the 
County Commissioner to attend an ngo peace building exercise. During 
the meeting an urgent message came from the commissioner to these 
youth. There were reports of a Nuer attack in the grazing lands and they 
needed to go immediately. The commissioner would facilitate them by 
letting them use his car. These young men rushed to the grazing lands in 
immediate compliance.118
In this instance, both County Commissioner and titweng shared the desire to 
defend the grazing lands. This Commissioner would even fight along side the 
titweng or, at other times, successfully instruct them not to raid. Yet, when a 
new Commissioner of this county was appointed, the titweng made it clear 
that their willingness to comply with his authority was conditional. The former 
Commissioner’s authority over the titweng was charismatic, based on per-
ceptions of his security aptitude and his appreciation of the titweng’s role. 
Therefore, under some commissioners, the titweng acted as a proxy govern-
ment force while, for others, they slipped away from association with govern-
ment and were an armed, uncontrollable threat.
As community police, local perception changed about the type of war they 
were allowed to fight, with legitimate violence, according to a junior chief, now 
limited to ‘wars of the government’ (tong hakuma) in that they were required 
to defend, but not initiate raids. This appears to reference the distinction made 
117 Deputy of Chief Arrest, Kuajok (Warrap State), February 2013 (in Dinka).
118 Extract from author’s field notes, March 2012.
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by Riek Machar in the 1990s119 and the titweng’s role in the 1980s and 1990s in 
support of the spla.120 However, despite uniforms and a restrained mandate, 
most titweng continued to consider themselves part of the home community 
further complicating the boundary of the home – government spheres. Much 
of the insistence by the titweng that they are not the government was an 
attempt to reduce the government’s authority over them. At the same time as 
the introduction of community police, the more formal, national force of the 
Mathiang Anyoor was being constructed. This force would fight against Sudan 
in Heglig in 2012 and, from 2014, in the new civil war, they would fight for Salva 
Kiir’s government against the newly formed opposition force of the spla-In 
Opposition (spla-io) led by Riek Machar. Many titweng feared being taken 
across the government boundary if it involved being spatially away from their 
local communities and cattle.121 The simultaneous introduction of the ‘com-
munity police’ and the Mathiang Anyoor led the titweng to assume that under 
any government authority they could easily be absorbed into a nationally re-
locatable army. For the titweng, the distinction between ‘community police’ 
and army solider was unclear. Government demands to mobilise youth into 
the army were one of the main conflicts between the home leadership and the 
government.122
The renaming of the titweng as ‘community police’ also left ambiguous the 
chiefs’ role in their supervision. For example, in early 2013, discontent grew in 
Kuac South Payam (Gogrial West County, Warrap State) with a complaint that 
too few of their titweng had been selected to be ‘community police’ and 
rearmed. The chief was disgruntled as he had previously controlled the distri-
bution of guns based on cattle ownership. With the lack of ‘community police’ 
selected by the Warrap State authorities, a senior chief sent some of his titweng 
to a training camp in the neighbouring state of Western Bahr el Ghazal.123 In 
his words, “[n]ot all youth had been selected as community police and given 
guns. So, those without guns went to Wau to get guns”.124 The chief was subse-
quently arrested by the Warrap State authorities in January 2013125 under the 
allegation that he was attempting to annex his area to Western Bahr el Ghazal.
119 S. Hutchinson, ‘Nuer Ethnicity Militarized’, 16:3 Anthropology Today (2000) pp. 6–13.
120 Deputy of Chief Arrest, Kuajok (Warrap State), February 2013 (in Dinka).
121 Similarly, the White Armies in 2014 supported the spla-io but did not surrender 
command.
122 Chiefs’ meeting, Warrap State, March 2012 (in Dinka).
123 Deputy of Chief Arrest, Kuajok (Warrap State), February 2013 (in Dinka).
124 Deputy of Chief Arrest, Kuajok (Warrap State), February 2013 (in Dinka).
125 Sudan Tribune, Warrap Police Arrest Traditional Leader For Training “Home Guards”, 
26 January 2013, <www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45304>, visited on January 2013.
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The incorporation of the titweng into the government also created an alter-
native vision of the government. After the cpa, the government was perceived 
as dominated by the western Dinka. While the (western Dinka) titweng were 
drawn into the government, similar groups, such as the White Army, were seen 
as illegitimate and disarmed. Despite a publically multi-ethnic, unified govern-
ment at this time,126 the treatment of the titweng was indicative of government 
favouring the interests of certain western Dinka.
4 The Titweng and a National Military Force
As mentioned above, at the time of the creation of the ‘community police’, 
thousands of titweng were also recruited into the more formal forces of the 
Mathiang Anyoor. Urban, returnee youth in Aweil also made a large contribu-
tion to this force. The Mathiang Anyoor was never formally incorporated into 
the spla’s hierarchy of commands and accountability. While receiving spla 
uniforms and arms, they were not given food or salaries. The formation of the 
Mathiang Anyoor was accompanied by attempts to symbolically draw together 
the communities of Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal States – the main 
recruiting grounds for this force. For example, in 2012, former Chief Justice 
Ambrose Riing Thiik127 was active in reigniting relations, through a celebra-
tion  of shared ancestry between members of one clan that historically 
migrated to different parts of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States. This 
helped foster a common, western Dinka identity that would support regional 
mobilisation.
In 2014, the Mathiang Anyoor played a significant role in supporting the gov-
ernment’s military efforts against the spla-io across South Sudan, such as 
being instrumental in recapturing Bor under the command of Paul Malong 
and continuing to fight across the Greater Upper Nile. President Kiir refused to 
call the Mathiang-Anyoor a “private army”,128 instead referring to them as the 
126 It was not until July 2013 that Salva Kiir sacked his entire cabinet including Vice President 
Riek Machar, dividing publically leadership of the government and spla.
127 Ambrose is mentioned in the leaked draft report of the African Union Commission of 
Inquiry on South Sudan report (au coi report) (March 2015) in relation to the ‘Jieng 
Council of Elders’. This Council is accused of being active in constructing the ‘Dut ku 
Beny’ in late 2013. Ambrose’s relationship with Salva Kiir was strained in 2007 during fight-
ing between their home communities. Yet, long term friendship helped restore this 
relationship.
128 Peter Nyaba had described this force as a ‘private army’ in the draft au coi report.
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“reserve army”.129 In April 2014, the Nuer spla Chief of Staff was removed and 
replaced by Paul Malong. Malong’s spla leadership and his personal com-
mand over the Mathiang-Anyoor drew this force further into government. Yet, 
many Mathiang-Anyoor have questioned their role and deserted to return to 
their home communities, complaining of lack of payment and food. Their lack 
of formal inclusion in the spla has prevented their inclusion in the payroll. 
Even after becoming Chief of Staff, Paul Malong was not able to rapidly mobil-
ise financial support for these forces. In early 2014, Malong was accused of 
funding this force from Northern Bahr el Ghazal State’s own financial resources, 
but his response was to insist that only the force itself had been drawn from his 
home area.130 Some of the deserters from the Mathiang Anyoor were summar-
ily executed if they were caught before reaching their homelands. This return-
ing home mimics similar complaints by the spla-io131 in relation to the White 
Armies.
The force of the Dut ku Beny,132 a newly formed force stationed near Juba 
from mid 2013, was also constructed from cattle-keeping youth of the western 
Dinka with some likely drawn from the Mathiang Anyoor as well as remaining 
titweng. Their Dut ku Beny nickname highlighted the perception that their 
job was to protect their boss – Salva Kiir. It drew on the local idiom of cattle- 
keeping youth’s legitimate use of violence to protect the home community. 
Protection of the leader at the government’s centre was at a spatial distance 
from the home communities. Yet, it was synonymous with protection of the 
home community itself because having elites in government provided access 
for the home community to government resources and security.
President Kiir brought this force to Luri Bridge near Juba in 2013, but Kiir 
failed to persuade the spla High Command to recognise the force as part of 
the national army, as had been the case with the broader Mathiaang Anyoor. 
The High Command was reluctant to accept this force as part of the spla and 
provide them with salaries or arms,133 as there were concerns over its ethnic 
129 Salva Kiir as reported by Radio Tamazuj, ‘Transcript: Kiir’s ‘One People, One Nation’ 
speech’, Radio Tamazuj, 16 February 2015, visited on 25 March 2015.
130 Sudan Tribune, N. Bahr el Ghazal Suspends Secretary General Over Financial Scandal, 
20 February 2014, <www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50029>, visited on March 2015.
131 In April 2014, the military opposition to Kiir’s government, led by Machar, during an ini-
tial meeting of the leadership, they gave themselves the name of the spla-io. However, 
many spla-io commanders now question the name as they perceive the problem as 
broader than an internal division in the spla.
132 A literal translation is ‘protector of the boss’.
133 Sudan Tribune, South Sudan President Admits Forming Private Army’ 17 February 2014, 
<sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49993>, visited on January 2015.
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homogeneity and its principle loyalty to President Kiir as opposed to the wider 
state security hierarchy.
On 15 December 2013, violence started in the Presidential Guard in Juba. 
Over that weekend, a meeting of the spla’s National Liberation Council had 
increased political tensions. The Presidential Guard was a heterogeneous col-
lection of soldiers who had previously served under a variety of commanders 
who were now competing politically. Although the exact events in the 
Presidential Guard that night remain disputed, something prompted Nuer sol-
diers to resist disarmament and take control of the barracks. This could have 
been an isolated episode of violence, yet South Sudanese leadership and citi-
zens immediately interpreted it as having national political and military signifi-
cance.134 By the morning of the 16 December, various forces were brought into 
Juba including Kiir’s Dut ku Beny. At this time, this force made up of Dinka from 
Bahr el Ghazal had still not formally been recognised by the spla High 
Command. The spla High Command found themselves confronted by both a 
defecting Nuer force in the Presidential Guard and this Dinka force that they 
had refused to recognise. By opting to work with the Dut ku Beny against the 
defecting Nuer force, the spla recognised the defecting Nuer as the ‘enemy’ 
and the Dut ku Beny as part of the security mechanisms of government. By 2014, 
the force was being described as part of the spla and government.135 Kiir’s 
claim that the December 2013 violence was an attempted coup gave the spla 
and the Dut ku Beny a shared interest in the protection of Kiir’s government.
The fighters of the Dut ku Beny also brought with them the assumed enemy 
of the Nuer constructed during the wars in their homelands since the 1990s. 
Nuer civilians, as well as soldiers, were targeted in Juba in December 2013. Even 
if there was no direct command for violence to be targeted on an ethnic basis, 
the targeting of Nuer was not unpredictable due to this historic moral frame-
work. With the Dut ku Beny behaving as government actors, the government 
appeared to be captured by the western Dinka and in opposition to an enemy 
defined in ethnic terms, highlighting “the crucial fact that the state is neither a 
neutral actor nor a passive arena within which ethnic groups operate”.136
134 President Kiir, on the 16 December, described events on the night of the 15 December as a 
coup attempted against the President. This has been widely disputed. Yet, fear of national 
violence was so widespread that many South Sudanese, on hearing of the fight in the 
Presidential Guard, anticipated wide spread violence to follow. One South Sudanese 
acquaintance in Juba, by late evening on 15 December, had already called the author to 
describe how ‘the war has started’.
135 Radio Tamazuj, Official: 14 Women Killed in Warrap Attack, visited on 2 April 2014.
136 A. Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the 
Modern World (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) p. 173.
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5 Conclusion
Since the cpa, titweng have slowly been incorporated into the government, 
partly as a local defence force renamed ‘community police’ and eventually as 
the Mathiaang Anyoor and Dut ku Beny. As a useful and locally legitimate force, 
the titweng brought both efficiency and legitimacy to the government, but 
blurred the home-government boundary and incorporated an ethnic-based 
understanding of the legitimacy of violence into government. This highlights 
the impact that idioms constructed at a local level can have on the centre.
After the new eruption of violence in December 2013 in South Sudan, there 
has been “widespread killings of civilians, often based on their ethnicity, and 
mass destruction and looting of civilian property”.137 International observers 
have called for elites to be held responsible for these apparent violations of 
international law. The ethnic nature of the violence seems to increase further 
the need for accountability. At the time of writing, civil society is voicing con-
cern that a peace agreement will be reached between elites without a commit-
ment to justice. For many South Sudanese, this absence of justice will give 
legitimacy to ongoing violence as revenge. Yet, in international law, the cate-
gorisation of victims and perpetrators of violence makes a difference. As this 
article highlights, in South Sudan there is no clear distinction between civilian 
and combatant, nor government and non-government. Boundaries are often 
blurred and identities recast to meet the demands of their fluid, violent con-
texts. While justice is clearly demanded,, it must be recognised that the bound-
aries described in international law may not easily trace over those experiences 
in daily life in South Sudan. With ethnicity-based violence having implications 
in international law there is a need to recognise the “complex ways the intri-
cate and shifting tissue of ethnicity has been woven into the fabric of the 
African state, and of the repercussions this has throughout society”.138 The eth-
nicisation of the South Sudanese government through the incorporation of the 
armed, western Dinka into the army involves a complex mix of constructed 
culture, visions of ethnicity, and agency of armed men and elites. The killing of 
civilians based on ethnicity is not limited to short-term elite commands, but 
was woven over time into the culture and fabric of the government.
137 South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, Human Rights 
Watch, 7 August 2014.
138 V. Broch-Due (ed), Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa 
(Rouledge, Abingdon, 2005) p. 12.
